This was not particularly fair, because Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius had repeatedly tried to launch those negotiations, but they could not abandon the position that their countries had been illegally annexed. Tallinn, Riga and Vilnius had repeatedly tried to launch negotiations, but they could not abandon the position that their countries had been illegally annexed. Koivisto accused the Baltic governments for the failure of those negotiations. On the first occasion, Koivisto said that Finland had sympathy for Baltic independence movements, but Baltic leaders should negotiate with Moscow on the basis of the Soviet constitution. In January 1991 Koivisto decided to make two public statements and give interviews: on the 10 th and on the 16 th of January. Bahovski refers to Koivisto’s announcements in January 1991 concerning Baltic affairs as the lowest point in Estonian-Finnish relations in recent time. Koivisto’s Realpolitik applied to Estonia was probably too much even for the Finnish electorate accustomed to Finlandization throughout the Cold-War era. This policy was naturally resented by the nationalists.īahovski observes that the criticism of Koivisto’s line on the Baltic question, culminating in January 1991, was even stronger in the Finnish public than among the Baltic population. The stability of the USSR trumped support for democratic national movements, including those in the Baltic Soviet republics. Bush with whom Koivisto was conferring regularly.
This was not a unique position it was in tune for example with the line taken by the US President George H. The context is that Koivisto had subordinated his Baltic policy to the primary goal of maintaining friendly relations with Gorbachev and the leadership of the USSR at the time. In his obituary, Bahovski focuses on January 1991, which naturally excites Estonians most. The zero point in Estonian-Finnish relations In the second part, I will discuss later perceptions of the events and the shadow that Koivisto left on Estonian-Finnish relations. I will also add some historical detail, so that the reader could understand the context. This was one of the few longer commentaries devoted to Koivisto on his passing away in the Estonian press. It reflects well the general view of Koivisto that has formed over the past decades. In the first part, I will follow an obituary penned by Erkki Bahovski, a seasoned writer of international politics. Another factor that has probably influenced perceptions of Koivisto and Finland’s foreign policy is the degree to which Estonians have cared to remember Estonian own diplomacy in 1990-1991, something that I will try to make clear in the following essay. Indeed, his image may improve even further if the intentions, and not only the content, of his pronouncements of January 1991 will be appreciated. However, I will argue that Koivisto’s reputation has improved over time as knowledge of other aspects of his policy has transpired.
The Baltic perception at the time was that Koivisto was not supporting the Baltic independence movements but rather the stability of the Soviet Union. The January 1991 episode has therefore stained Koivisto’s image in Estonia and has sometimes even hurt Finnish-Estonian relations. For some, Koivisto seemed to even tolerate Mikhail Gorbachev’s use of military force. The purpose of his intervention has remained obscure for a long time. There, his legacy is perhaps more controversial.Īfter failing to comment on Baltic affairs for a long time, in January 1991 the President Mauno Koivisto made his views public, and quite bluntly so, as we will see below. Koivisto is also remembered on the other side of the Finnish Gulf. This was a transformational and eventually a successful period in Finnish history.
In Finland, President Mauno Koivisto is remembered for his role in ending Finnish dependency on Russia, and taking Finland through the lama of the early 1990s and into the European Union.
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